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TOURO LAWREVEW
The extensive discussion of a substantially similar issue in
Maresca allowed the Appellate Division, Second Department in
Carey to issue a brief decision based upon the court of appeals'
decision.
In conclusion, the mandatory retirement provisions of the New
York Constitution and the Judiciary Law do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause with respect to judges other than supreme court
justices or judges on the court of appeals.
Chasalow v. Board of AssessorslO
(decided March 14, 1994)
The petitioners, a group of Nassau County taxpayers, brought
suit claiming that the Nassau County Board of Assessors violated
the Equal Protection Clauses of both the State101 and Federal 102
Constitutions, by employing a cost method in its assessment of
class I residential properties which caused "gross disparities in
the tax burden imposed upon similarly-situated taxpayers." ' 103
The Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the
petitioner's constitutional rights had not been violated. 104 The
§ 6(c). Judges on the court of appeals and justices of the supreme court are
required to have been admitted to practice law in the State of New York for at
least ten years while other judges are required to have been admitted to
practice law for only five years. N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 20(a). Finally, the
court in Carey concluded by plainly stating the fact that the plaintiff had
occasionally served as a supreme court justice was irrelevant to his position.
Carey, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
100. 202 A.D.2d 499, 609 N.Y.S.2d 27 (2d Dep't 1994).
101. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article I, § 11 provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states in
pertinent part: "No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
103. Chasalow, 202 A.D.2d at 500, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
104. Id. at 499, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 28. In this decision, the appellate division
reversed the Nassau County Supreme Court holding that the method utilized by
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appellate division found that the results derived from the method
employed by Nassau County conformed to both the statewide and
national average without forming "gross disparities" in
taxation. 105
The petitioners, owners of class I real property located in
Nassau County, were seeking a reduction of their real property
assessments for the 1988/89 tax year.106 Petitioners claimed that
the cost method employed by the County of Nassau in assessing
class I residential property caused a "gross disparit[y] in the tax
burden imposed upon similarly-situated taxpayers."107 To
support their position, the petitioners applied a "statistical
calculation known as the coefficient of dispersion." 108 Petitioners
introduced expert testimony establishing that the New York State
Board of Equalization and Assessment had determined that the
coefficient of dispersion for class I property in Nassau County in
1986 was 20.12. In addition a 1988 study found the coefficient of
dispersion at 18.18% which was well above the normal standard
of 15%.109 However, a Nassau County expert challenged these
findings and found that the proper standard for Nassau County to
apply was 16.64%, which was only slightly above the normal
statewide standards. 110
The court's rationale in Chasalow was primarily based on two
holdings. First, the court stated that in the area of real property
105. Id. at 501, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
106. Chasalow v. Board of Assessors, 176 A.D.2d 800, 802, 575 N.Y.S.2d
129, 131 (2d Dep't 1991). In 1991, the appellate division held that the
supreme court had erred when it had resolved the equal protection issue sua
sponte because the Nassau County Board of Assessors had not received proper
notice or an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 803, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
107. Chasalow, 202 A.D.2d at 500, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
108. Id. "[A] coefficient of dispersion is a statistical comparison of 'the
closeness of assessment ratios on individual parcels to each other.'" Id.
(quoting Waccabuc Construction Corp. v. Assessor of the town of Lewisboro,
166 A.D.2d 523, 560 N.Y.S.2d 805 (2d Dep't 1990)). The lower the
coefficient the closer to an equal rate the parcels of property are being assessed
at. Id.
109. Id. at 500, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 28-29. The petitioners' expert also noted
that the 15% is a "goal for taxing jurisdiction" and no penalty is imposed for
violating the goal. Id.
110. Id. at 500-01, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
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taxation, "complete uniformity" was not needed to establish the
equal protection requirements.1 11 All that was needed to be
proven was a "rough equality" between similarly situated
taxpayers. 112 In support of this contention, the court relied on the
New York Court of Appeals decision in Foss v. City of
Rochester,1 1 3 which held that "the integrity of any system of
taxation, and particularly real property taxation, rests upon the
premise that similarly situated taxpayers pay the same share of
tax burden.' 1 14 The court concluded that the evidence presented
by the petitioners did not establish inequality but merely "a
moderate deviation from a hypothetical norm." 115  This
deviation, based on information reported by SBEA, 116 was in
conformity with the statewide and national average. 1 17
The second basis for the court's holding was that "'gross
disparities in the taxation of similarly-situated taxpayers can
constitute a violation of the constitutional right to equal
111. Id. at 501, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
112. Id.
113. 65 N.Y.2d 247, 480 N.E.2d 717, 491 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985). In Foss,
the court held that real property taxation is based upon the principle that
"similarly situated taxpayers" are to pay equal taxes. Id. at 254, 480 N.E.2d at
720, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
114. Id. See Hagy v. Lewis, 280 N.Y. 184, 186, 20 N.E.2d 386, 386
(1939) (stating that the tax law provides that a court must "secure equality of
assessment"); Warren v. Carter, 109 N.Y. 576, 579, 17 N.E. 222, 223 (1888)
(stating that tax law proceeds upon the premise that all properties must "bear
its equal share of the burden of taxation"); Mid-Island Shopping Plaza, Inc. v.
Podeyn, 25 Misc. 2d 972; 204 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960)
(holding that assessment ratios are to be uniform in all taxable properties),
aff'd, 14 A.D.2d 581, 218 N.Y.S.2d 249 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 966,
180 N.E.2d 63, 224 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1961).
115. Chasalow, 202 A.D.2d at 501, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 29. The Chasalow
court held that the cost method utilized by Nassau county only made a
moderate distinction between owners of class I property. Id.
116. Id. In Chasalow, the Court referred to an SBEA report that obtained
data establishing the coefficient of dispersion. The findings concluded that
"only 7.2% of all assessing units in the State of New York met the SBEA's
residential standard," while the rest of the state and country were substantially
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protection of the laws.'" 118 In support of this holding, the court
cited Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of
Webster County,1 19 in which the United States Supreme Court
established that a taxpayer's constitutional right to equal
protection of the law was denied when the county's tax assessor
created "gross disparities in the assessed value of generally
comparable property." 12 0 The Chasalow court stated that the
petitioner's failed to prove that the cost method utilized by
Nassau County in fact made a "distinction between owners of
Class I property that would constitute a disparate tax treatment"
in a constitutional sense. 12 1 In addition, the court found the
methodology utilized by Nassau County to be both a reasonable
and equitable system. 12 2 Further, federal law allows states to
classify and tax properties differently, so long as these
differences are not arbitrary or capricious. 12 3 .
In conclusion, both the New York State and the federal courts
interpret a "gross disparity" in the taxation of similarly-situated
taxpayers as being violative of their respective equal protection
clauses. Moreover, both federal and state courts hold that
distinctions made on an arbitrary basis without a legitimate state
purpose would be violative of the Equal Protection Clauses.
Therefore, due to the absence of evidence demonstrating "gross
disparities" or "invidious discrimination" no violation of either
the Federal or New York State Equal Protection Clauses was
established.
118. Id. (citations omitted).
119. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
120. Id. at 337.
121. Chasalow, 202 A.D.2d at 501, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
122. Id.
123. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 343. The Court stated that the states have
broad powers to "impose and collect taxes." The Court further held that the
states can impose different tax burdens to different divisions of property so
long as the divisions and differences are reasonable. Id. See Nordlinger v.
Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that tax assessments have a legitimate state interest).
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